Third Circuit Holds That Consent Order from ALJ Confers Prevailing Party Status for Fee Claim Under IDEA

Per P.N. v. Clementon Bd. of Educ., 442 F.3d 848 (3d Cir. Apr. 5, 2006):

. . . [T]he [Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)], 20 U.S.C. § 1440, et seq., contains a specific provision authorizing an order for such fees as “part of the costs to the parents of a child with a disability who is the prevailing party.” J.O. ex rel. C.O. v. Orange Tp. Bd. of Educ., 287 F.3d 267, 271 (3d Cir.2002). . . .

. . .

This court has held that Buckhannon applies to the fee-shifting provision of the IDEA. . . .

. . .

[Clementon Board of Education] . . . argues that because the [Administrative Law Judge] here did not and could not retain jurisdiction to enforce its consent orders in accordance with Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994), these orders lacked the judicial imprimatur required by Buckhannon to confer prevailing party status.

. . .

As is clear from A.R. ex rel. R.V. v. New York City Dept. of Educ., 407 F.3d 65 (2d Cir.2005), a settlement of administrative proceedings that is judicially enforceable meets the Buckhannon requirements. Because the consent orders entered here were enforceable through an action under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 and under state law, these consent orders . . . satisfy Buckhannon.