Eleventh Circuit Affirms Sanction of Dismissal With Prejudice for Plaintiff Who Used False Identity in Filing Complaints

Per Zocaras v. Castro, 465 F.3d 479 (11th Cir. Sep 13, 2006):

The plaintiff contends that the record contains no evidence that his use of a false name was willful instead of merely negligent. We disagree for the reasons the district court set out in its detailed findings of fact. Our review of that court's findings is only for clear error, and here there clearly is none. The court convincingly rejected each of the arguments that the plaintiff's counsel put forward against a finding of willfulness, and we adopt its reasoning. The plaintiff did not merely slip up. He followed a pattern of deception for a period of at least six years from the time he got the driver's license in 1996 through multiple arrests, convictions, and incarcerations, and filed more than thirty pleadings and motions under a false name in this case. At least some of those pleadings and motions were filed under penalty of perjury. All of them hid his actual identity. Not until the pretrial proceedings were completed and a jury was in the box did the plaintiff finally own up to who he really is.

A trial is not a masquerade party nor is it a game of judicial hide-n-seek where the plaintiff may offer the defendant the added challenge of uncovering his real name. We sometimes speak of litigation as a search for the truth, but the parties ought not have to search for each other's true identity. Rule 10(a) requires that the name of the parties be disclosed in the complaint; Rule 11 forbids lying in pleadings, motions, and other papers filed with the court; and Rule 41(b) provides for dismissal with prejudice as the ultimate sanction for violation of the rules. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 10(a); Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 11; Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 41(b).

That brings us to the second reason the plaintiff asserts against the district court's order of dismissal. The plaintiff contends that the dismissal was improper because the district court did not explicitly consider lesser sanctions and reject them as inadequate. In addition to finding willful contempt, a district court must consider the possibility of alternative, lesser sanctions. Betty K Agencies, Ltd., 432 F.3d at 1339. However, we have made clear that such consideration need not be explicit. Gratton v. Great Am. Commc'ns, 178 F.3d 1373, 1374 (11th Cir.1999) ("Dismissal under Rule 41(b) is appropriate where there is ... an implicit or explicit finding that lesser sanctions would not suffice."); Goforth v. Owens, 766 F.2d 1533, 1535 (11th Cir.1985) ("The record also supports an implicit finding that any lesser sanction than dismissal would not have served the interests of justice.").

It is true that the district court did not explicitly consider and reject lesser sanctions, but a determination that no other sanction would suffice radiates from its explanation for the dismissal. No point would be served by remanding for the court to make explicit that which is inescapably implicit. And the court's implicit determination is correct. Nothing short of putting the plaintiff out of court will properly punish his serious and protracted violation of the rules and adequately deter future violations by other parties. As the Seventh Circuit explained in a similar case, "[f]iling a case under a false name deliberately, and without sufficient justification, certainly qualifies as flagrant contempt for the judicial process and amounts to behavior that transcends the interests of the parties in the underlying action." Dotson v. Bravo, 321 F.3d 663, 668 (7th Cir.2003). It is conduct that "so violates the judicial process that imposition of a harsh penalty is appropriate not only to reprimand the offender, but also to deter future parties from trampling upon the integrity of the court." Id.; see also Goforth, 766 F.2d at 1535 ("[W]here any other sanction would fail to cure the harm ... dismissal can be appropriate."). Permitting the plaintiff to pursue his claim would take the punch out of the punishment for pummeling the probity of the judicial system.