Ninth Circuit Finds Complaint against Ashcroft to Be Sufficiently Pleaded under Iqbal

Per Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, --- F.3d ----, 2009 WL 2836448 (9th Cir. Sept. 4, 2009):

Here, unlike Iqbal's allegations, al-Kidd's complaint “plausibly suggest[s]” unlawful conduct, and does more than contain bare allegations of an impermissible policy. Id. at 1950. While the complaint similarly alleges that Ashcroft is the “principal architect” of the policy, the complaint in this case contains specific statements that Ashcroft himself made regarding the post-September 11th use of the material witness statute. Ashcroft stated that enhanced tactics, such as the use of the material witness statute, “form one part of the department's concentrated strategy to prevent terrorist attacks by taking suspected terrorists off the street,” and that “[a]ggressive detention of lawbreakers and material witnesses is vital to preventing, disrupting or delaying new attacks.” Other top DOJ officials candidly admitted that the material witness statute was viewed as an important “investigative tool” where they could obtain “evidence” about the witness. The complaint also contains reference to congressional testimony from FBI Director Mueller, stating that al-Kidd's arrest was one of the government's anti-terrorism successes-without any caveat that al-Kidd was arrested only as a witness. Comparatively, Iqbal's complaint contained no factual allegations detailing statements made by Muller and Ashcroft regarding discrimination. The specific allegations in al-Kidd's complaint plausibly suggest something more than just bare allegations of improper purpose; they demonstrate that the Attorney General purposefully used the material witness statute to detain suspects whom he wished to investigate and detain preventatively, and that al-Kidd was subjected to this policy.